Sunday's editorial in dagens nyheter, starting with the claim that Sweden has a proud history of responding quickly in the event of a crisis. The question is asked, why it needs to be a few weeks before the Swedish authorities to react to the reports about the seriousness of the virus spreading, and of a heavily burdened public health systems.
It is absolutely correct that the american crisis has historically been characterized by a remarkable slowness. The management of the south asian tsunami in 2004, is perhaps one of the most egregious examples.
the forest fire in Västmanland, sweden in 2014, revealed to the evaluation of the operational search and rescue and crisis management operations, there were defects that a greater or lesser extent, involved all stakeholders, and skill levels. It was, among other things, on the pure ignorance of the reality of fighting the big fires, and what the actors could bring to the table. It was all about the inability to create and communicate a collective awareness, and on the inability to determine when you need to move on to other practices than the normal ones. There was also a question about the inability to make reasonable and appropriate decisions regarding the direction, design, prioritization, management, and collaboration. Finally, it was the fact that almost all of the players have initially acted too slowly and too cautiously.
in the Summer of 2018, the hit in Sweden once again, by widespread forest fires, and these fires were the subject of a public inquiry. Sweden asked in a very early stage of the EUROPEAN union for help, because their own skills are not sufficient. The efforts during the fires was thought to have been dealt with quite well. At the same time, each of the identified weaknesses of many, and, in principle, the same as in 2014. The commission came to the conclusion that Sweden is not well enough equipped for us to be able to feel safe about the future of the large and complex forest fires.
without the presence of the virus, which puts Sweden as well as in many other countries in the sample. According to the minister for social protection, ms Lena Hallengren, who, in a variety of contexts to refer to the regions ' responsibility, the readiness to deal with the virus timely. Also, the Swedish national Board of health, refers to the regions the responsibility to plan their own activities, on the basis that there are ”rules, and the clarity of what you are going to cope in the health care in transition”. From the Health side, however, they did not say how many people would need to be cared for by an extensive and severe infection, or what should be the priorities that would need to be done. In our neighbouring countries, Denmark and Norway, is in its planning (which is based on the annual pandemiplaner from a worst-case scenario of a 25 per cent and 10-15 per cent of the sick population. According to the Norwegian calculation model, Sweden is in need of 4,000 intensivvårdsplatser. Folkhälsomyndigheten believe, however, that this is an unreasonable number to work with. They could not muster the number of places available. At the same time, is preparing for several regions of the materielbrist.
in my opinion, are some of the responses on the selection of the reacting senfärdigt in the event of a crisis, to be found in the few details I mentioned.
in our krisberedskapssystem is based on a few basic principles. They are, in brief, that in a crisis, in so far as it is possible, on the basis that it is the responsibility of a business, under normal circumstances, even during a crisis (the person), and at the lowest possible level in the community (principle of subsidiarity) and also in regular work situations (principle of equality). It is against this background that Lena Hallengrens, and the Swedish national Board of health, the references to the regions of responsibility are to be seen.
But the principles are not as clear-cut as they might seem. How, for example, the expression ”in so far as it is possible” and ”lowest possible level” to be understood? And when the principles do not hold? Of the crisis in times of peace, and there is no answer. However, it is clear that the person is subject to all of the actors in everyday life are preparing themselves so that their operations can continue even during a time of crisis. It is also assumed that the operators are preparing themselves through work, and when it becomes a real-life situation, the available resources can be used efficiently and for the operators of the different measures support one another in an effective manner. They are different players, it is expected, therefore, in a time of crisis, forming a whole with the ability to handle any given situation.
on the part of all stakeholders to have the capacity to handle all the possible situations is large. There seems to be little or no understanding of a crisis situation, the important points are different from the mainstream, often in streamlined, business. The anomalies are frequent and necessary, but in many cases they are neither prepared or trained. It is not unusual that the operators have developed emergency response plans that are then not used to support, in a time of crisis. Therefore, it is not surprising, then, that one of the recurring weaknesses in the Swedish crisis management is that many of the players initially taking a cautious approach. And when you act you do it is often too easy. The danger is not only to address the immediate needs of the delays, but also to signal to the outside world is delayed, the operator does not have the capacity to deal with their share of the crisis on their own. Rather than form a whole, appear to be players who are more or less isolated islands, which solves problems by means of ad-hoc interventions, or not at all.
Rather than form a whole, appear to be players who are more or less isolated islands, which solves problems by means of ad-hoc interventions, or not at all,
but The Swedish model is based on the independently organised public authorities. Also, the government is not a government agency. In time of peace no authority to take the command of any other authority. When it comes to the local and regional crisis management, the so-called extraordinäre events, such as the un, allows for the legislation of certain ansvarsförskjutning in each level. One option is to lift the responsibility from a regional to a national level, that is to say, the level of the government, does not exist. Thus, it is not possible to lift the management of the crisis at this level, even if it would be necessary for a rational approach to the prioritisation of the various actions or the co-ordination of the efforts of the other reasons, it would suffer as a result of a crisis to be dealt with by as the principle of liability of the responsible operators.
it would have to 4.000 intensivvårdplatser is considered to be an impossible need to meet. In the event of a couple one hundred virussmittade people preparing for some of the players in materielbrist. These data indicate that the responsible actors of the preparation do not have to analyse the either the possibility of a worst-case scenario, or the ability, either alone or in combination with other agents, to manage such a scenario. We don't know yet if we are going to be faced with such a challenge. We must, however, be understood that the present risks of a widespread and severe contamination and future threats and risks, which lead to the events of the fast, or the svåröverblickbara course of events, will give rise to large, complex initiatives that require extreme responsiveness as regards the adequacy of the cross-cutting decisions.
Who is going to lead or take charge in those situations? At the present time, the answer is: no! The krishanteringsråd found in the cabinet office, provides a forum for the exchange of information and discussion between the government and the authorities, nothing more and nothing less.
All experience has shown that we need a body, or as a function of the level of the government, with the responsibility and the authority to be in an emergency situation, to temporarily manage and co-ordinate the operational response. In times of crisis needs of the people with a clearly defined leadership – and not a talking shop.
Link to a graphic