The challenges for Israel of a ground operation in Gaza: protecting hostages and planning for the day after

Experts warn that Israel must be clear about who will control the Strip and see how to avoid extending the conflict

MADRID, 13 Oct. (EUROPA PRESS) -

The Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has started a war against the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) after its massive attack in which more than 1,300 Israelis have died to end this terrorist group, which he has compared to the Islamic State that has predicted that it will be "long and difficult." Within it, it is assumed that there will be a ground offensive that is not without great challenges.

For now, Israel has focused its response on massive bombings on the Gaza Strip, from where Hamas launched its surprise operation on October 7, but the warning to the population of the north of this territory to evacuate it in the next 24 hours seems to portend that the Israeli response will enter a new phase.

However, all experts agree in pointing out the complication that a ground offensive on the Gaza Strip, a narrow territory of about 40 by 11 kilometers in which more than 2.2 million people reside and with one of the highest population densities, highest in the world, will have for the Israeli Army, no matter how much it has previously attempted to weaken Hamas' capabilities with aerial bombardments.

"The only way for Israel to achieve its goal of eliminating Hamas's military capacity is a house-to-house, block-by-block urban war," emphasizes Alex Plitsas, an expert at the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center, which would require the use of both conventional and special operations forces that acted methodically.

"This could take several months given the size of Gaza, the number of terrorists willing to fight, the extent of the terrorists' weapons arsenals and the size of the civilian population," he warns, insisting that "it will not be easy" but given its "superior military capacity" it is something feasible for Israel.

But without a doubt the biggest obstacle is the presence in the coastal territory of the more than 150 hostages that the Hamas militiamen took with them on October 7, among whom there would also be some foreigners.

Plitsas acknowledges that a rescue operation "would be difficult" since it is assumed that the hostages have been scattered throughout the Strip and because a mission using helicopters would be risky due to the possibility of attacks with light weapons, rocket launchers or portable anti-aircraft systems. .

In this expert's opinion, this limits the options to "a naval or land operation." Additionally, the lack of medical evacuation support or the inability to send reinforcements "would make it difficult to carry out clandestine hostage rescue missions in various locations in Gaza."

This being the case, he suggests that the most likely option is that once the ground invasion occurs, forces specialized in this type of operations can be included in it, something for which both Israel and the United States have equipment.

Furthermore, before embarking on a ground offensive, Israel should be clear about its ultimate goal and what it will be like the day after in the Gaza Strip, from which it unilaterally withdrew in 2005. "Wars are not won or lost. "They lose only because of military factors," underlines William F. Wechsler, director of the Rafik Hariri Center and the Middle East programs of the Atlantic Council.

"The United States has learned this timeless lesson again, and especially painfully, in both Iraq and Afghanistan," recalls this expert, referring to the invasion of both countries, in a case to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003. and in another to overthrow the Taliban in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks by Al Qaeda.

"Israel must not make a similar mistake," Wechsler emphasizes in an article. "While your generals plan for war, your political leaders must plan for the peace that will follow, and that starts by ensuring that the right questions are asked from the beginning," he adds, underscoring the need to be clear about what will happen in Gaza next.

This expert predicts that the Israeli Government will not want a return to the 'status quo' prior to this conflict, with Hamas controlling the Strip, and there will be division between those who propose a new occupation and those who are committed to renewing the settler movement in this territory.

Wenchler also proposes as options extending the power of the Palestinian Authority, which now governs the West Bank, to Gaza, although it is very weakened, or even trying to impose some "strong man" outside of both Hamas and Fatah, the president's party. Palestinian, Mahmoud Abbas.

On the other hand, the Israeli Government has expressed its desire to put an end to Hamas once and for all. However, as Richard Haas, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), warns in an article, "Hamas cannot be eliminated, because it represents both an ideology and an organization."

"Efforts to destroy it risk increasing support for them," he warns, quoting former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who questioned whether drone strikes against terrorists could be creating "more" by causing collateral civilian casualties.

Furthermore, in Haas's opinion, Israel faces the "serious dilemma" of how to weaken Hamas and dissuade it from new attacks without dragging the Lebanese Shiite militia party Hezbollah into the conflict, which has 150,000 rockets with which to attack Israel. to extend violence also to the West Bank.

As Bruce Hoffman, a CFR terrorism expert, warns, if Israel finally opts for a large-scale ground offensive in Gaza, it could not only drag Hezbollah and even Iran, which supports both the Lebanese group and Hamas, into the conflict, but also attract "foreign fighters from Al Qaeda and the Taliban.